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To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942 (Modern War Studies) [2009, PDF/EPUB, ENG]

by David Glantz

(138 ratings)
Book cover
The confrontation between German and Soviet forces at Stalingrad was a titanic clash of armies on an unprecedented scale—a campaign that was both a turning point in World War II and a lasting symbol of that war's power and devastation. Yet despite the attention lavished on this epic battle by historians, much about it has been greatly misunderstood or hidden from view—as David Glantz, the world's foremost authority on the Red Army in World War II, now shows.

This first volume in Glantz's masterly trilogy draws on previously unseen or neglected sources to provide the definitive account of the opening phase of this iconic Eastern Front campaign. Glantz has combed daily official records from both sides—including the Red Army General Staff, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the German Sixth Army, and the Soviet 62nd Army—to produce a work of unparalleled detail and fresh interpretations. Jonathan House, an authority on twentieth-century warfare, adds further insight and context.

Hitler's original objective was not Stalingrad but the Caucasus oilfields to the south of the city. So he divided his Army Group South into two parts-one to secure the city on his flank, one to capture the oilfields. Glantz reveals for the first time how Stalin, in response, demanded that the Red Army stand and fight rather than withdraw, leading to the numerous little-known combat engagements that seriously eroded the Wehrmacht's strength before it even reached Stalingrad. He shows that, although advancing German forces essentially destroyed the armies of the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts, the Soviets resisted the German advance much more vigorously than has been thought through constant counterattacks, ultimately halting the German offensive at the gates of Stalingrad.

This fresh, eye-opening account and the subsequent companion volumes—on the actual battle for the city itself and the successful Soviet counteroffensive that followed—will dramatically revise and expand our understanding of what remains a military campaign for the ages.

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Book details


  • Author : David Glantz
  • Publisher : University Press of Kansas; Illustrated edition
  • Published : 04-20-2009
  • Language : English
  • Pages : 678
  • ISBN-10 : 0700616306
  • ISBN-13 : 978-0700616305
  • Reader Reviews : 138 (4.7)
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About the Author


David Glantz


David M Glantz is a former US Army intelligence specialist with a unique knowledge of the Russian army and Russian military history. His WHEN TITANS CLASHED is the standard single volume account of the war in Russia.

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Reader Reviews

J
Kenneth J McFarlane
Highest quality content.
Reviewed in Canada on 04-04-2015
Very detailed, refreshingly light on opinion and heavy on fact, you begin to see that the author did a tremendous amount of research here, and increasingly trust what your reading. Remarkable. Some of the maps are hard to read, then again, I do need new glasses..
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J
F. Carol Sabin
An excellent book? Not really...much more research needed!
Reviewed in the United States on 01-29-2012
Before I write what I had to say, I would like to point out that the reviewers previous to me wrote good reviews of this book. What I have to write is more like supplemental with a slightly different perception.

This book proves to be a well written and from all I can gather, a well researched book that is extremely readable and interesting.

However, the book is mostly a German-centric view of the campaign with some good perception coming even from the Russian side. As is often the case with Glantz, little attention and details is devoted to the other contributors at Operation Blue, namely the Romanian, Italian and Hungarian forces. One serious student must remember that Operation Blue is the second most important operation involving all Axis countries (after Barbarossa), but even so this is not an important issue for the authors. Even the Germans bore the brunt of this Operation Blue, it is also important to say that this operation could not be completed without its ally's contribution.

The lack of clear explanations about the role and expectations from the Axis allies frustrated, but did not surprise me. But the problem is rooted in the lack of source material on one hand and the lack of correct interest in Germany's allies from Glantz&House part, on the other hand. The authors rely heavily on the few most valuable Western and German contemporary accounts available, but these usually blamed Germany's allies for all defeats, alongside with weather, Soviet superiority and ... Hitler; few books about Axis allies are studied and even fewer material is published by these authors, in an equidistant manner.

At page 8, the only page treating the satellite forces, the authors stated that 'the army of Finland was the most capable and highly motivated, but the same could not be said for the other satellite armies.' Yes, Finn army had these values, but also the much more involved armies of other nations, which were Germany's allies. Finland was a 'partner or a comrade in war' for Germany and was involved in war very close to its borders; it had limited objectives and did not want to join the Axis under Germany. The other countries were much more involved, penetrating very deep in Soviet territory and some, Romanian forces especially, fought very hard battles with few materials and equipment available (Germany was supposed to equip all Romanian divisions on Eastern front, but never materialized completely, a fact neglected/not known by these authors).

Next page Glantz&House told us that '27 Romanian divisions were equivalent in size to a German brigade'. A very false statement (to say the least!), which demonstrated the lack of interest in a better researching of all available sources about Germany's Allies. Normally, in 1941, a Romanian infantry division had about 17,500 personnel; in 1942 they were close to 13-14,000 personnel (due to the reduction from 9 to 6 battalions and very similar to German divisions strenght). Therefore, having about the same manpower this statement is 100% false. Of course, German divisions were much better equipped and trained, due to their better armament industry and war experience. No doubt, there were no German brigades with such manpower! On the other hand, the Romanian cavalry division had about 7-8,000 personnel, but it had a different TO&E and, of course, different missions. It is also true that an Italian Celere division had about 7-8,000 personnel, which is indeed the manpower of a German brigade.

The authors continued with another intriguing paragraph:' For obvious reasons due to politics and national pride, the contributing governments insisted that these troops serve under their own corps and filed army commanders.' As a normally this request might be, there were always interference from German command with some Axis units. Very often, Romanian corps/divisions/regiments were separated from parent higher echelon and send to serve under German command. On other hand, all Italian units were grouped in one Army, since such German behavior; thus, the 3 elite Alpini divisions were not sent in Caucasus Mountains (ideally suited for them!), but kept inside Italian 8 Army on Don River. Hungarian Army was not divided either. Only Romanian forces were sent in 3-4 directions (Caucasus, Crimea, N Stalingrad and S Stalingrad). Another false statement!

The author's false statements continued, with wrong facts about the only Romania's armored division. Actually, the Romanian Panzer division recovered after Odessa siege, in November 1942 being part of 48 Pz Corps, the operational reserve of Army Group B (behind 3 Romanian Army). It was equipped with obsolete German Pz 38(t) tanks and which were no match for Soviet T-34's as well as AT rifles during Uranus.

And continued... 'The remaining satellite divisions were lightly equipped cavalry and infantry formations, more suitable for rear-area security against Soviet partisans than for confronting a Red Army tank force'. This (partially) false paragraph should be corrected with some new information. Although being 'lightly equipped', Romanian forces assisted and were actually very suitable, in the front line not only in the rear, in the conquest of Crimea and Sevastopol, Caucasus ports and mountains pass, Kuban peninsula and reaching the outskirts of Stalingrad.

Next paragraphs is simply 'amazing': 'Although the Germans provided some capable antitank batteries to support their allies ...' It must be well known that Germany provided only one 75 mm antitank battery, drawn by horses - therefore limited mobility/maneuver in a antitank battle - for the majority, not all, Romanian divisions. Mr Glantz and Mr House how can one AT battery (German and capable) support a DIVISION, with a frontage of 18-20km, thus an AT gun for 3-4 km of front?

Another comment about authors' next paragraph:' Even the Romanian troops, whose poorly trained officers were openly abusive of their men, demonstrated their willingness to fight but only if properly supported by heavy weapons'. Romanian forces, as ALL armies in this world, had better and worse personnel. Since no army was perfect, this statement can be true for ALL forces involved in Eastern Front battles, including Germany's (who emanated these statements, from liaison officers!)who seemed to forget their own conduct. Of course, no one can exclude bad behavior from some generals or officers, but these were isolated cases and were rather a minority and not a majority. This behavior was not tolerated as a rule in Romanian Army. You cannot win so many battles up to Stalingrad and even after with such men! Another interesting fact for authors: those 'poorly trained Romanian officers' actually won more Iron Crosses than all Axis troops put together! Even not supported by heavy weapons or dive bombers Romanian troops performed as best as they could and were Germany's best allies (Von Manstein).Some defeates were more probably the result of insufficient modern equipment, promised by Germany, eager to see more troops of the Front.

For the serious students interested in studying Axis Allies battles and equipment, I highly recommend Richard DiNardo's book 'Germany and Axis Power: From Coalition to Collapse' and Hans Werner Neulen's book 'In the skies of Europe: Air forces allied to the Luftwaffe 1939-1945'. Also 'Stopped at Stalingrad' written by Joel Hayward provides a far much better picture about the role and capabilities of Axis Allies in the same operation.

I am looking forward to seeing the third and the last volume of this trilogy dedicated to Operation Uranus and subsequent operations. I only hope that Glantz&House will do better researches and observe equidistantly the role and the behavior of the Germany's allies..
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J
Mr. Richard A. Yeo
Operation Blau - Hitler's Summer Offensive Spring/Summer 1942
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 08-14-2019
I finished reading this volume some time ago. Previously I have found Glantz's books on Operation Mars & Zitadelle to be among his best works & I must admit to not entirely looking forward to this widely covered subject & to being sceptical about any new information that could emerge. However although this is only volume 1, I couldn't have been more wrong. Most books on Stalingrad gloss over Operation Blau (in it's many phases) & arrive pretty quickly at the battle for the city itself, such as Anthony Beevor's 'Stalingrad' book. Glantz bring to life many relatively unknown parts of the summer offensive & splits it down in to smaller phases such as Wilhelm, Blau I, Blau II, Blau III. It starts on the front-line after the failed Soviet Kharkov offensive, where the objective was Voronezh. Here the fighting was extremely fierce & the Soviets far from running to escape & avoiding battle threw large amounts of men & material to stop the Germans & suffered huge losses. But due to a lack of armour & infantry the Germans failed to bag large amounts of prisoners as they had done in 1941. This was because the Soviets this time did not, follow a policy of not retreating & allowing no territory to be captured. Still they lost over 150,000 men. Glantz now explains Hitler's folly having already launched the offensive with barely enough men, splits his army group into two & diverts part into the Caucasus, prematurely. With the Soviets wearing down the Germans in a battle of attrition & constantly raising new armies & equipment, the inevitable had to happen. This books gives the most comprehensive covering of the Operation Blau that I have come across to date. It is recommended reading to anyone enthusiast of the Soviet/German struggle in WWII. While probably not for the casual reader, it offers in depth analysis of this phase of the war & I eagerly awaited volume II..
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